least intrusive alternative doctrine was supposed to be applied in such caseso have all been considered by later federal and state courts, with the predictable range of decisions.
These issues have been discussed and reconsidered in multiple arenas from the scholarly literature-both legal and behavioralto professional conferences and to law school classes and other academic settings. Two seemingly unrelated issues, however, have been the subject of virtually no consideration at all, and we are raising both of these so as to jog readers into thinking about these questions when they reflect on Sell's limits and its potential reach. One of these relates to a topic that one of us (MLP) has been writing about and talking about extensively in recent years: that of the application of international human rights law to the forensic process in all its aspects, especially the potential impact of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD")." The other is a topic that, to the best of our knowledge, no one has written about. One of us (1VILP) discusses it yearly with students in his Criminal Procedure: Adjudication course, but there is still nothing in the literature about it: what happens when a wealthy person, able to make bail on any bailable crime, is in the community pending trial, and becomes incompetent to stand trial (or even, perhaps, was always incompetent) ? We know the impact of bail on subsequent convictions and lengths of sentence; 2 yet, there is-again, to the 9 Thus, Robert Cochrane and his colleagues note that "substantially likely" was not defined in Sell, but they draw on cases in other areas of the law to conclude that, most likely, it is akin to "clear and convincing evidence. best of our knowledge-nothing on this question whatsoever. We discuss both of these, and also look at the second issue through the filter of therapeutic jurisprudence.
The title of this paper draws on Bob Dylan's song Gotta Serve Somebody, from Slow Train Coming, the first album of his gospel/born again period. The lyric I am using comes from this verse:
You might be a rock 'n' roll addict prancing on the stage You might have drugs at your command, women in a cage You may be a businessman or some high-degree thief They may call you Doctor or they may call you Chief But you're gonna have to serve somebody, yes indeed You're gonna have to serve somebody Well, it may be the devil or it may be the Lord But you're gonna have to serve somebody' 3 According to Michael Gray, one of the most prominent of Dylan scholars, the song urges that "moral shiftiness be renounced in favour of clear-sightedness about a clear and unavoidable choice." 4 Defendants who are incompetent to stand trial often are deprived of their rights to make such "clear" choices, though the consequences are often "unavoidable."
I. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
We must begin with a consideration of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)." Although the United States has signed, but not yet ratified, this Convention,'" it is necessary that we take this Convention seriously in all matters that relate to the intersection of international human between his arraignment and the final adjudication of his case is more likely to receive a criminal conviction or jail sentence than an accused who has been free on bail."). rights law and criminal procedure.
There is no question that the CRPD is the most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies to persons with disabilities. 7 It furthers the human rights approach to disability-endorsing a social model and repudiating a purely medical model-and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in nearly every aspect of life." Although little attention has been paid to its potential impact on forensic patients," we believe it is essential that there be a new focus notwithstanding the fact that virtually no consideration of the Convention's application to this population yet appears in the literature.20
The state of the law as it relates to persons with disabilities must be radically reconsidered, especially in regards to forensic populations. 2 ' Within the context of its human rights approach, the Disability Convention firmly endorses a social model of disability and re-conceptualizes mental health rights as disability rights-a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law. 22 Professor Christopher Slobogin has written carefully of the potential impact of this Convention on the population with whom we are concerned: persons currently incompetent to stand trial. 43 In a recent paper (awaiting publication), he sets out the standard state of the law on both criminal responsibility and incompetency, and then says, in what will be startling to some, " [t] he Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) directs signatory States to undo all of this." 44 He notes that Article 14 of the CRPD states that "the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty," 4 5 and that Article 12 provides that States "shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life." 46 These are, Slobogin notes, "radical provisions." 4 7 In short, Slobogin concludes:
[U]nder the CRPD, mental disability per se should play no role in laws that deprive people of liberty (or of property or any other significant interest). Preventive detention and involuntary treatment rules must be drafted so as to apply to everyone. People with impaired decision-making abilities are to be assisted in, not prevented from, making decisions, and if the decisions they make violate a criminal law, they are to pay the consequences to the extent everyone else does. 52 Recently, in an article considering the role of mediation in guardianship following the CRPD, Professor Jennifer L. Wright 48 How does all this relate to the issue at hand? These commentaries appear to counsel against any use of involuntary medication for the purposes of making defendants competent to stand trial, especially if there may be a question as to whether the incompetency status as we know it remains valid. We believe-and Slobogin believes-that it does (although it now appears that an arm of the United Nations believes that it does not), but the question of whether involuntarily medicating a forensic patient" violates, in the words of the CRPD, the "integrity of the person"" is, under any circumstances, an important one that we must take seriously.
II. ON INCOME INEQUALITY
Let us shift gears now and move on to the other topic we wish to explore: the extent to which our entire corpus of incompetency to stand trial/involuntary medication law is, basically, a law that applies only to the economically impoverished. All cases in this area of the law take for granted-indeed, it is never even discussed-that the defendant is in custody awaiting trial and that, most likely, he has been transferred from a jail to a maximum security forensic mental health facility." No one has ever seriously challenged Professor Bruce Winick's assertion that "the incompetency-to-stand-trial process has become a back-door route to the mental hospital."" We have found no reported casenor have we even heard of an unreported case-in which a Sell application to involuntarily medicate (or pre-Sell, a Charters application, or any similar case-based application)-was sought in a case in which the defendant was on bail. 59 What happens, then, when a defendant who is awaiting trial is not detained, but is living within the community after making bail and the question of competency arises?
As noted above, the Sell Court developed a four-pronged test to determine whether the medication could be administered without the individual's consent.
6 0 Aside from the medication having to be "medically appropriate" and "substantially unlikely to have side " Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision over forty years ago in Jackson v. Indiana, establishing time limits on a defendant's presumptive stay in a maximum security hospital if he is not likely to regain his competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future, in many jurisdictions, all defendants thought to be incompetent to stand trial-no matter how trivial the underlying charge-are mandatorily housed in such maximum security facilities, and the issue of bail is often never raised. There, the Court ruled that people with mental disabilities had a qualified right to community treatment.6 Moreover, treatment plans were to be developed in the most integrated way possible, meaning that community-based treatment, if the individual could (whether independently or with help) live within his or her own community, was the best course of action and would, ultimately, foster a therapeutic approach that first considered the dignity and integrity of each individual. What implications does this have for the question at hand? It should come as no surprise that detainment and incarceration can cause or exacerbate adverse mental health symptoms.
6 6 Loss of readily available access to a familial or community-based support system, loss of freedom, and the lack of appropriate treatment are some of the concerns that arise from being detained in such unforgiving and hostile settings.
In addition to providing better quality of treatment, less restrictive alternatives relieve the added stressors of incarceration, and detainment, as they focus primarily on the individual's health and well-being while promoting community integration; the individual can still work, maintain housing, collect benefits, be close to family, and collaborate with his or her attorney.
8
Diversion programs and alternative-to-incarceration options have further added to progress and awareness in this area. 6 " For example, the creation of mental health courts have-depending on their individual circumstances and charges-given some defendants with a mental illness or disability the opportunity to address their mental health needs in the context of their current court cases in attempts of both resolving the instant cases while providing the necessary treatment so as to offer the best opportunity to help stop the revolving door phenomenon that exists for many caught between the criminal justice system and the community.
70
While this is a start in re-conceptualizing the way mental illness is seen within the context of the criminal justice system, more work needs to be done. People with mental illnesses and disorders are held longer in pre-trial detention than those not so labeled." According to the Council of State Governments' Justice Center, the average length of stay for inmates at New York City's Department of Corrections is sixty-one days but almost double RTs that (112 days) for those with a mental illness. 72 Moreover, those with a mental illness are less likely to obtain bail, and remain detained an average of five times longer while waiting for bail to be made than their counterparts."
It is also important to consider the power of sanism and pretextuality in this entire inquiry. Sanism is "an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. . . [.] "74 Its corrosive effects have warped all aspects of the criminal process." "'Pretextuality' means that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage in similarly dishonest (frequently meretricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a 'high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends."'
76
These factors have "poisoned and corrupted" all of mental disability law," and we must keep this in mind when we approach the issue of mental health as it relates to incompetency and bail.
How 
394
[Vol. 8 the crime is "serious,"" so the Sell court clearly "got" the fact that involuntary medication might be sought in the full range of criminal cases. Yet, none of the cases construing Sell involve defendants in the community."o We have known for 50 years-since Anne Rankin's groundbreaking study"-the importance of bail decisions in ultimate jury verdicts and, in the cases of convictions, on the length of sentence.
8 2 By way of example, pretrial detention may falsely connote of guilt to jurors, which may ultimately, albeit it at times subconsciously, sway their opinion of the defendant, leading to a greater likelihood of conviction." This, combined with sanism and pretextuality, has the potential to be devastating to the defendant. 84 As discussed earlier, jail settings, in and of themselves, pose a unique set of risk factors not found in lesser restrictive settings.s Jail environments exacerbate existing mental health problems and cause new ones to manifest." Studies have shown that over half of jail inmates have been diagnosed with a mental illness or are receiving treatment for mental health-related issues." Jail staff workers often have no education or training in the appropriate treatment of detainees with a mental illness, and thus may respond with aggressive measures that ultimately exacerbate symptoms of their conditions." Many individuals with a mental illness are disciplined or placed in solitary confinement, rather than being afforded adequate treatment.
89 A person who has made bail, however, has more opportunities to obtain treatment and assist in his or her defense.
But there is nothing in the literature or the case law on the specific issue one of the authors (MLP) raise in this paper. Here is a hypothetical MLP regularly poses to his Criminal ProcedureAdjudication classes when discussing the topic of bail: imagine if a multimillionaire real estate magnate were indicted and charged with a serious criminal offense, and also had a major mental illness, and easily made bail. And let's hypothesize further that it became clear that, when that magnate came to court for pretrial appearances, that his mental illness might reasonably affect his competency to stand trial. His lawyer would most likely tell the judge that his client was seeing a psychiatrist on "the street," and was under his care.
And now let's hypothesize that that psychiatrist prescribed medication for the magnate that he didn't want to take. He could very likely pay his bill, walk out of the office, and visit another psychiatrist to see whether he was any happier with his prescription. Or maybe, he didn't want to take drugs at all. Maybe he wanted to try cognitive behavior therapy. In any event, there would be no connection via which the state could mandate which medication that the defendant would receive. 
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The courts have made it clear that we cannot have one set of laws for the rich and one for the poor. 90 and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread""-has been frequently cited.
9 2 Yet, we echo the actions that France denounced in cases involving the drugging of incompetent defendants without ever considering the discrimination inherent in such decisions. 93 The bail system has been criticized for decades as a means of punishing economic inequality and enforcing class and race discrimination, repudiating the goal of an unbiased and fair criminal justice system. 94 Those who are detained while awaiting trial and unable to make bail face a unique set of circumstances when (or if) they do reach a trial stage of their case. As previously discussed, juries may presume heightened dangerousness for one who is detained, using that false notion against the individual. One who is in jail also may not have clothing available to him or her, and could show up to their trial in jail-assigned clothes. Jumpsuits or worn clothing could be misinterpreted as a client being disheveled or, again, invoke a subconscious feeling of guilt. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the medication refusal rights of forensic patients-those convicted of crime, those at trial pleading the insanity defense, and those awaiting trial-is doctrinally inconsistent, in large part, because of the totemic significance to the Court of the defendant's status in the criminal AMERICAN UNION 459 (3d ed. 1874) ) (Thomas Cooley's repetition of John Locke's statement that legislators "'are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.").
93
It goes without saying that, given racial income disparities, this policy has a disparate impact on persons of color. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 84, at 47; see also Perlin, supra note 34, at 311 (describing the racial disproportionality present in juvenile detention facilities).
94 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 68, at 13. 95 Id. justice system.
We have referred to this previously as "litigational side-effects." 96 It is irrelevant to a person's blood biochemistry if he has been convicted, is at trial or is currently not fit to be tried; yet, the law on each of these is radically different." Any sense that this might partially make-since convicts are presumed to give up some of their civil rights upon conviction, 98 since prison security needs may trump civil liberties, 99 since a competent person at trial is presumed innocent (even where the plea of insanity concedes the commission of the actus reus)'"-disappears in the fact setting we are discussing here. Let us also turn to therapeutic jurisprudence and consider what that school of thought may have to offer us. expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. ' The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles.'" There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: "the law's use of 'mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning cannot impinge upon justice concerns.""o As one of us (MLP) has written elsewhere, "an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties."'
06
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's lives"' and focuses on the law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.'o It suggests that "law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law should attempt to bring about healing and wellness."'" Therapeutic jurisprudence "is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications.""o It is also part of a growing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully."' In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism."" 2 That is, therapeutic jurisprudence supports an ethic of care."' One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is a commitment to dignity." 4 Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness,"' arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.
6
The question to be posed here is this: to what extent do our pretrial drugging practices comport with TJ principles? To what extent do they comply with Professor Ronner's aspirations that the "3 V's"-voluntariness, voice and validation'"-be present in all matters? Forcing involuntary medication cuts against the very concept of therapeutic jurisprudence," ' and certainly violates "the 3 Vs" articulated by Professor Ronner, and loses sight of the person's integrity." 9 Importantly, this notion of personal integrity is also protected by the CRPD.1 2 0
No citations are needed to support the assertion that a dual track system-one for rich persons and one for poor personsviolates the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence.
The fact of seeking to refuse medication in a jail setting can exacerbate the danger of the jail environment in and of itself. Jail inmates relatively tell advocates that, although they might be amenable to medication within the community, they resist taking medication because it could make them more vulnerable and targeted within The right to refuse treatment has a strong therapeutic jurisprudence component. Although public attention has been focused primarily on what is often seen as the antitherapeutic aspect of this right, we believe that there are significant benefits here as well: due process rights for the mentally disabled, better checks on doctors and clinical staff to ensure that medication and other treatment are not being administered as a means of punishment or convenience, and improved protection from administration of inappropriate medications or medications causing severe side effects, among others. concept of "least restrictive alternative" in the Sell context.' 24 We believe that courts must consider what alternatives would be available if a defendant were in the community, and weigh these alternatives as part of any Sell assessment.
1 2 5 Third, courts must acknowledge that the Americans with Disabilities Actl 26 requires a consideration of potential pre-trial alternatives in the case of currently-incompetent criminal defendants.
As long as many states demand that such defendants be housed in maximum security facilities-no matter how serious or trivial their criminal charges-it is unlikely that there will be any meaningful change in the status quo. Just as a rule that all incompetent to stand trial defendants must be housed in such facilities violates the ADA, so does a dual track system that establishes significant limitations on the right of some defendants to refuse treatment (or to be given a meaningful voice in the selection of their own treatment) but imposes no such restrictions on another cohort (those that can afford bail). Finally, our current practices fly in the face of therapeutic jurisprudence principles.
CONCLUSION
We have sought to focus on two seemingly-unrelated issues that have potentially huge impacts on the IST/forced drugging process: the application of international human rights law and the impact of economic inequality. There is little or nothing in the legal literature on either topic, but we believe that we must turn our attention to both if we are to make significant progress in understanding the litigational side-effects of the Sell decision, and recognizing the future impact of international human rights law-especially in the context of the CRPD-on this area of law and policy. Sell has spawned a cottage industry of scholarly commentary, and has been cited in 557 reported cases. ' believe, though, that it is time for us to consider both of the factors discussed in this paper from the perspectives of human rights, due process, civil liberties and therapeutic jurisprudence.
Writing about Bob Dylan in the context of the civil rights movement, Charles Hughes has concluded that Gotta Serve Somebody, the song from which the first part of the title is taken, "foregrounds themes of personal choice and responsibility."'
28
If we begin to take more seriously the themes of international human rights law and income equality, then, perhaps, in the substantive context of this paper, these "personal choices" will finally be honored.
